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Why did fewer people change address in England and Wales in the 2000s than in the 1970s? 
Evidence from an analysis of the ONS Longitudinal Study 
 
Introduction 
The existence of a long-term decline in internal migration rates in the USA across all spatial scales has 
become well established in the literature (Cooke 2011, 2013; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2012; Wolf 
and Longino, 2005).  Less well known, but starting to draw attention, is a fall in migration rates as 
measured by address changes in England and Wales since the 1970s.   This mirrors the USA experience 
not only in that it is long term, and is durable beyond the vagaries of economic cycles, but also in that 
it is mainly seen over shorter distances of less than 10km in the UK (Champion and Shuttleworth, 
2016a, 2016b) and for within-county moves in the USA but differs in that no decline in long-distance 
moves have been observed in the UK case.  Such migratory falls, wherever they occur, are unexpected.  
After all, we are said to be living in an ‘age of migration’, a world that is ‘on the move’, and in societies 
that are becoming more spatially mobile with greater fluidity and transience.  These assumptions are 
deeply embedded in migration and social theory where increasing income, social development, and 
progress away from sedentary pre-industrial societies to industrial, modern, and indeed post-modern 
societies are commonly seen as eroding ties to community and place and leading to greater population 
mobility (Ravenstein, 1885; Zelinsky, 1971; Fischer, 2002; Sheller and Urry, 2006).   The evidence that 
internal migration is decreasing in at least some countries does not disprove these theories. However, 
it does raise interesting questions since address changes – internal migration – are an important 
element in the spatial and social mobility of populations regardless of other mobilities on other 
temporal and spatial scales (Champion, Cooke and Shuttleworth, forthcoming).  
 
The growing evidence that some national populations are becoming less rather than more mobile 
therefore raises some interesting theoretical questions.   The factors that underlie decreasing rates of 
address change are so far not well understood although there are many hypotheses.  These range from 
structural changes in population composition in terms of age, housing tenure, and educational 
attainment through the restructuring of labour markets (for example, the rise of two-earner 
households and the decline of functional Fordist industrial regions), to changed migration behaviour 
arising from better transportation and communications technology (for example, the substitution of 
address changes by longer-distance commuting, and the use of ICTs – (Cooke and Shuttleworth 2017).  
This is by no means an exhaustive list, and there is scope for much research to better understand why 
and how people are changing address less frequently. 
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The implications of decreasing address change rates are, if anything, less well understood than the 
causes of these declines but nevertheless it is possible to discern some of their impacts.  In the 
economic sphere, the UK Government in 2015, for instance, attributed some of the slow growth in 
labour productivity, relative to international competitors, to the relative spatial immobility of the 
population and to housing shortages (HM Treasury 2015).  For social policy, the increasing residential 
immobility of the population might have complex and contradictory effects.  On the one hand, it may 
strengthen local communities as stable populations are more likely to promote bonding social capital.  
Furthermore, individuals who remain where they are, if not ‘frustrated leavers’, may well be happier 
than people who move on multiple occasions. However, the reverse of increasing community strength 
and ties is that geographical and social silos are maintained and even increased as people live with 
others with the same characteristics and are less likely to mix residentially.   
 
The paper sets its main task as understanding the main dimensions of the decline in address changes 
in England and Wales since the 1970s.  In particular, following Cooke (2011), it seeks to assess the 
relative importance of changes in the composition of the population versus observed differences in 
migration behaviour (in other words the changing address-changing rates of different demographic 
groups) as drivers of the decrease in short-distance migration.  The next section discusses the literature 
on migration to develop more focussed questions and to provide some context for the quantitative 
analysis which lies at the heart of the paper.  Following this, the data of the ONS Longitudinal Study 
used for the analysis is introduced.  Descriptive analysis forms the first part of the results section as a 
preface to an Oaxaca analysis similar to that undertaken by Cooke (2011) in the USA which decomposes 
the difference in address change rates between 1971-81 and 2001-11 and which deals simultaneously 
with behavioural and compositional changes.  Finally, the interpretations and implications of the 
results are discussed.    
 
Literature review 
Differences in levels of migration, measured in aggregate between populations, are a consequence of 
the demographic structure of these populations and the sum of individual migration propensities, in 
other words population composition and rate effects.  The latter are the result of individual migration 
decisions, some of which are realised and some frustrated, and yet others which were not desired but 
were perhaps enforced by circumstance. The former are changes in population structure that influence 
overall migration levels – for example, an increase in the proportion of young people should lead to a 
higher migration rate since these age groups are on average more migratory than older people.  The 
paper does not deal with how the psychology of migration decisions has changed through time and 
whether the migration declines in the UK and the USA have been caused, for instance, by an increase 
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in the proportion of frustrated non-movers.  It cannot deal with causality in this sense.  It concentrates 
instead on changing population structures, and on changes in migration behaviour as measured by 
actual moves, weighing their relative importance in altering rates of address change in England and 
Wales since the 1970s, dealing thereby with causality in a more aggregate way.  Fortunately, there is 
a wide literature on the demographic correlates of migration, and it is this which is most relevant to 
the concerns of this analysis since it outlines those population groups which are more or less migratory 
and whose changing relative compositional shares will impact on changing migration levels. 
 
Champion (2005) summarises some of these patterns.  A good starting point is the clear differences in 
migration behaviour by age with younger people being more migratory than older people since they 
are more likely to change address as they make employment- and education-related transitions and 
also leave the parental home, something also noted by Thomas et al (2015).  There are also differentials 
by housing tenure with people in private-rented accommodation being more spatially mobile than 
those in social- rented or owner-occupied housing (Coulter et al 2015).  Economic activity is also a 
classic factor associated with migration.  Champion (2005) observes that people who are unemployed 
are more likely to change address than others. However, others have suggested that unemployed 
people probably lack economic resources to enable moves and are hence more likely to remain in place 
to take advantage of local community support (Kitching, 1990; Green 2018).  The ground is firmer when 
education is considered since there is a strong consensus that having any qualifications increases the 
propensity to change address over someone with no qualifications and that this propensity increases 
as educational attainment increases (Champion, 2005).  Similarly, social class and occupation appear 
to influence propensities to change address with those in higher-status occupations and those in higher 
social classes being more likely to move than those, for example, in manual or elementary occupations.  
Finally, marital status is also important. Single people, whether previously married or not, tend to 
change address more often than married people.  Shifts in partnership formation/dissolution are 
therefore likely to influence the overall rate of address changing in a population.   
 
This body of literature also indicates how the correlates of, and reasons for, changing address vary by 
distance, something which is of key importance given the difference between the USA and England 
and Wales in their migration declines.  Coulter and Scott (2015) present a good starting point in their 
discussion of how the motivations for changing address vary by distance. Typically, longer-distance 
moves are associated with younger people and employment- and education-related reasons whereas 
shorter-distance address changes are more common amongst the middle-aged and older parts of the 
population and are often prompted by factors associated with housing, neighbourhood and 
environment.  Shorter-distance moves are also associated with less advantaged people such as those 
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who are unemployed or in social-rented accommodation.  These observations are corroborated when 
the correlates of longer- versus shorter-distance moves are considered.  Here, the more skilled and 
educated are more likely to move over longer distances as also are military personnel (Gordon, 1982; 
Niedomysl, 2011).  Private renters are mobile over all spatial scales and are more likely in particular to 
migrate longer distances than social renters.   
 
These relationships are observed empirically when the rates of (a) changing address and (b) moving 
over distances of 50km or more in England and Wales 1971-81 and 2001-11 (based on characteristics 
at the start of each decade) were compared and contrasted by Champion and Shuttleworth (2015).  
The expected differentials by demographic sub-group for each time period were observed; younger 
people were more mobile than older, private renters were more migratory than other tenure 
categories, as were those with degrees compared with those who were not. Furthermore, some groups 
such as those with degrees were more mobile over ranges of 50km than more.  However, looking at 
the pattern of change through time, nearly all population groups had lower migration rates in 2001-11 
than in 1971-81.  
 
This discussion leads to some expectations to inform the analysis of the compositional factors that are 
associated with the decrease in the rate of address changing since 1971.  There are two separate but 
closely-related issues, the decrease in all address changes, and the fall in moves of 10km or less which 
accounts for most of this decline (Champion and Shuttleworth, 2016b) – in contrast to the position in 
the USA where moves have declined at all spatial scales.  In dealing with these issues, the central 
concern is whether the changes in the relative size of population groups (for example, the declining 
proportions of younger people and private renters) have outweighed increases in the size of more 
mobile sections of the population (for example, those with degrees).   
 
Besides these compositional considerations are questions about the extent to which changes in 
observed migration behaviour (for example, the changing migratory rates of different population 
subgroups) act to counteract or reinforce the effects of changes in population composition.  There is 
an extensive literature that seeks to explain the long-term migration decline in the USA in terms of 
changing migration behaviour.  This points, amongst other factors, to the rise of ‘secular rootedness’ 
(Cooke 2011), the growth of ICTs (Cooke 2013; Cooke and Shuttleworth 2017), convergence of regional 
housing and labour markets (Partridge et al 2012), the rise of dual-earner households, and the 
substitution of housing moves by longer-distance commuting (Champion, Cooke and Shuttleworth, 
forthcoming).  This factors might all make people ‘stay put’ as migration rates fall and behaviour 
changes through time.   
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Differences in migration rates between two time periods can therefore be conceptualised as two 
components, namely shifts in population composition and migration rates.  The central aim of this 
paper is to identify how far the decline in overall migration rates in England and Wales between 1971-
81 and 2011-11 can be explained by changed population composition or by changed behaviour. Our 
approach to answering this question is described in the next section which presents more information 
on the ONS Longitudinal Study and the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, a data source and a method 
that are both well placed to approach this type of problem.  
 
Data and methods 
Data 
A wide range of data sources were considered and rejected for the analysis before the choice was 
made to use the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study (ONS LS) for this study.  The National 
Health Service Central Register (NHSCR), for example, has information on address changes between 
censuses dating from the 1970s (Champion and Shuttleworth 2016a) but has no demographic 
information other than age and gender and does not record all address changes but only those 
involving moves between local health authority areas.  Census data products such as the aggregate 
tables on one-year migration flows, by their very nature, only record address changes in the year 
before the census and are thus subject to the effects of short-term conditions such as the business 
cycle, a problem which also afflicts individual microdata produced from the census, although for these 
latter datasets there is a rich range of individual and household information available.  Finally, there is 
a wide range of cohort and longitudinal studies in the UK based on information collected via survey 
methods.  These present a rich range of information on attitudes and behaviours.  However, they have 
relatively small samples and they suffer attrition and non-response between waves.   
 
By contrast, as noted by Champion and Shuttleworth (2016b), the ONS LS is particularly suitable to 
answer the questions posed in this paper because it covers a long time period (1971-2011) and it has 
individual-level data that can be flexibly analysed to pursue the analysis of differences by place and 
socio-demographic group and which is required by the Oaxaca-Blinder method.  Admittedly, there are 
some shortcomings with the dataset.  It does not, for example, cover the whole UK but only England 
& Wales and it does not contain information on all address changes but only on the transitions 
between address as recorded at one census and address at the following census.  Migration is 
therefore measured as a single transition over a decade and not as a series of events.  The data must 
also be used with care for analyses through time because of changes between censuses in the 
structure, coverage, and nature of questions.  Some variables, such as age, are unchanging between 
6 
 
censuses and are thus easy to use for through-time analyses.  Others, such as educational 
qualifications, change as rapidly as the ever-changing educational system and qualifications framework 
of England and Wales, and care therefore has to be taken to code them on to a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ to permit comparisons through time.  Yet other variables, such as ethnicity and limiting 
long-term illness, only make their first appearance in 1991 and thus cannot be included in a consistent 
suite of analytical variables from 1971 onwards.  There might also be subtle changes in the social 
meaning of some variables through time such as those concerning economic activity and the way that 
people self-report their status.  Finally, there are problems with the changing enumeration base of the 
census. Prime amongst these is that students have been enumerated at their term-time address from 
2001 onwards rather than their parental home as previously.   
 
However, while these issues mean that considerable care has to be taken in designing an analysis using 
the ONS LS, they should not obscure and override the considerable strengths of the data.   These 
include the large sample size – 1% of the population of England and Wales based on four birth dates – 
of 500,000 or more individuals, the high rate of matching (exceeding 95%) of eligible persons between 
censuses (eg excluding those who died, were born, and left or entered England and Wales between 
two census dates), and the relatively long duration (from 1971) covered by the data.  Furthermore, 
one of the weaknesses of the data noted above – information only available on address at the start 
and the end of the decade – is in some ways a strength since cyclical effects of economic boom and 
bust tend to average out over a ten-year period in a way they cannot if there is address information 
only in the year before the census. The 1970s, for instance started with an economic boom in 1972/73 
followed by the recessions of 1974/75 and 1979/80 prompted by oil shocks to the UK economy 
whereas the 2000s saw early economic growth followed by the financial crash of 2007/08 and then by 
recession.  These short-term period effects tend to be averaged out over a ten-year period.  
Additionally, there is high-quality information on peoples’ usual addresses thereby allowing a very 
good picture of all address changes and flexibility to consider particular distances of address changes. 
 
There were a number of considerations in designing the analytical database.  Firstly, the analysis 
compares and contrasts the address change rates of two groups of sample members, one being ONS 
LS members who were present in both the 1971 and 1981 Censuses, and the other those who were 
present in 2001 and 2011.    The logic of this is that address changes can only be measured for those 
for whom we can examine changes between censuses and therefore there must be a start and end 
point to measure the transition.  Secondly, only those aged 16-74 (at the start of each decade) are 
selected for the analysis.  This permits socio-economic variables and educational qualifications – only 
collected for this age group – to be included in the analysis.  It also concentrates on those individuals 
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who are likely to move independently as prime age adults rather than as dependent movers, such as 
children, who normally will follow their parents.  Thirdly, the analysis excludes students from both 
groups to avoid the problem associated with the 2001 change in the way that students’ usual addresses 
were defined.  This affords some degree of consistency but there is no entirely satisfactory answer to 
this problem since young people, and flows to and from higher education, are an important part of the 
internal migration scene within the UK and the proportion of students increased through time.  Some 
exploration of the impacts of excluding students was made and it was observed that the overall 
address changing rate fell from 55% in 1971-81 to 45% in 2001-11 (with students in the sample) to 
51.8% to 41.0% (without students).  The consistent ten percentage point fall encouraged confidence 
in the robustness of the analytical dataset.   
 
The focus of the paper is on three types of migration as outcome variables; (a) all address changing, 
(b) moves of 10km or less, and (c) moves of 50km or more.  The rationale for this three-fold choice was 
that the fall in all-address changing rates appeared to be particularly large, most of the decline was for 
moves of less than 10km, and there was an interest in exploring whether short-distance moves 
contrasted with those over long distance, here defined as 50km or more.  The all-address change rate 
in the analytical database fell from 51.8% to 41.0% between 1971-81 and 2001-11; the respective 
figures for moves of 50km or more and moves of less than 10km were from 8.5% to 7.2% and 35.1% 
to 27.5%.   
 
The independent variables for the analysis are listed in Table 1 which gives definitions and the numbers 
for each category.  Looking first at the set of explanatory variables, age was relatively straightforward 
and was coded categorically in ten-year age groups.  Gender was also easy to define for the analysis.  
Educational qualifications, reflecting the changing nature of the question between censuses, were 
more complex and, in the end, a pragmatic choice had to be made to code this variable simply as those 
who had at least a first degree versus those who did not.  Region was defined on a consistent 
geographical basis of five regions and housing tenure was grouped into four categories of owner 
occupation (whether owned or buying with a mortgage), private renting, social renting and communal 
establishments (defined as multi-person households such as care homes, hospitals, or prisons).  Marital 
status was coded to a consistent set of four categories, namely single, married, widowed and divorced.  
Whether someone was UK-born or not was used as a consistent variable through time.  Finally, 
economic activity and socio-economic group (SEG) were also included and coded to a consistent set of 
categories.   The selection of this set of variables was to some extent pragmatic and driven by what 
information could be consistently collected from the census in various years but it also was a result of 
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knowledge of the characteristics that are known from the literature to be associated with internal 
migration and address changing.   
 
Method 
As outlined in the literature review there are two main direct explanations for the reduction in address-
changing frequencies, whether long-distance or local moving. These are (a) compositional changes or 
(b) rate changes in migration behaviour.  The analysis therefore aims to estimate the relative 
contribution of these two components to the changes in migration behaviour observed in England and 
Wales between 1971 and 2011.  Specifically, the analysis focuses on how address changes from 1971 
to 1981 and from 2001 to 2011, change as a function of rate- and composition-effects as estimated 
using the Oaxaca-Blinder regression decomposition technique (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973).  Following 
Jann (2008), consider two regression models of the probability of changing address as a function of a 
vector of individual characteristics in 1971 and 2001: 
 
𝑌𝑖,1971↦1981=𝑋𝑖,1971𝛽1971 + 𝜀𝑖,1971 
and 
𝑌𝑖,2001↦2011=𝑋𝑖,2001𝛽2001 + 𝜀𝑖,2001 
therefore 
?̅?2001↦2011 −  ?̅?1971↦1981=[(?̅?2001 − ?̅?1971)?̂?1971] + [(?̂?2001 − ?̂?1971)?̅?1971]
+ [(?̅?2001 − ?̅?1971)(?̂?2001 − ?̂?1971)] 
 
Closely following Cooke (2011), the first term on the right hand side (RHS) is an estimate of the effect 
of changing population composition on the overall change in residential mobility based upon year 1971 
parameter estimates (i.e., composition effects). The second term on the RHS is an estimate of the 
effect of changing parameter estimates on the overall change in residential mobility based upon year 
1971 population characteristics (i.e., rate effects). The third term is a residual effect.  These values are 
then reported as percentages by dividing all terms by the overall change in residential mobility rates. 
The estimates for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition are implemented using the Oaxaca module (Jann 
2008) for Stata (StataCorp 2009). 
 
Intuitively, composition effects – the first term on the RHS – relate how changes in the composition of 
the population affect address changes between 1971 and 2011. For example, it is expected that the 
composition effect associated with older age categories will be negative; as the share of the population 
in older age categories increases the overall rate of address changes will decrease since older 
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populations move less often than younger populations. Similarly, rate effects – the second term on the 
RHS – relate how changes in behaviour among a specific subgroup affect overall differences in address 
changes between 1971 and 2011. For example, the increased proportion of graduates in 2001, drawn 
from a wider social background than in 1971, and not as scarce in the 2000s than in the 1970s, may 
mean that there are different returns to education in the two decades and thus different migration 
responses; graduates in the 2000s may be more similar to the rest of the population than in the 1970s 
and their migration rates (and also their relative propensity to move compared to non-graduates) 
might have fallen.   
 
The explanatory variables are categorical and are thus compared against a base category.  This means 
that the coefficients would vary if set against another base.  The findings should therefore not be 
regarded with spurious precision but as diagnostic and which can be interpreted with reference to the 
descriptive compositional and rate statistics presented in Table 2.  The models also consider just how 
starting conditions at the beginning of the decade were related to migration outcomes over the 
decade.  This makes sense in terms of temporal cause and outcome.  However, they do not assess how 
individuals shift with regard to the explanatory variables through the decade.  This also means that 
sensitivity is needed in interpreting the results.  One example is the pattern of change in the 
composition of the England and Wales housing market where private renting reached a trough in 2001 
but increased by the time of the 2011 Census. Some sample members in other housing tenures in 2001 
may have drifted into this traditionally more-mobile sector by 2011, and thus the composition of the 
population might have shifted in favour of greater migration by the end of the decade; the observed 
address changes 2001-11 might therefore overestimate the compositional effect of the decline of 
private renting but correspondingly underestimate the impact of declining migration rate or 
behavioural effects. 
 
Full model results are presented in an appendix because they are unwieldy but in Table 3, summary 
results are presented for all address changes (relative to non-movers), address changes over 50km or 
more (relative to movers of less than 50km and non-movers), and address changes of less than 10km 
(relative to non-movers and movers of 10km or more) with reference where needed to the Appendix 
tables and Table 2. With over 250,000 members of the sample in each decade virtually all coefficients 
are statistically significant.  We therefore do not discuss statistical significance in detail but rather 
concentrate on which effects are the largest and thus appear as the most important drivers of changing 
migration levels.   
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Results 
Since one of the major themes of the paper is how far changing social and demographic profiles alter 
migration levels, Table 2 summarises the composition of the England and Wales population in 1971 
and 2001 at the start of each analytical decade – fuller results are presented in Table A1 of the 
Appendix.  The changes presented in the table reassuringly present no major surprises although there 
are some interesting points to note.    We see increases in the shares of those who are non-UK born, 
with degrees, single or divorced, and professional or intermediate, and decreasing proportions of 
those who are married, private or social renters, or economically inactive, and also age shifts.  These 
are what might be expected given the literature on labour market, social and demographic change.  
Some initial thoughts on the impact of changing population balances on overall migration rates are 
possible.  Column 5 of this table highlights those sub-groups which had higher rates of address 
changing than the average in 1971-81.  Some of these groups such as those with degrees, who were 
skilled non-manual, intermediate, professional, divorced or single grew proportionately over the thirty 
years from 1971 whereas others whereas others such as private renters and those aged 16-24 
decreased.  Clearly, there are structural social changes over the medium to long term that are working 
to push address-changing rates upwards and others that are acting to push them downwards – the 
main question is which will win out and what the net effect will then be. 
 
Of course, changes in total migration rates across a population between two time periods are not just 
a consequence of changes in the proportions of mobile or immobile groups; they also result from 
changes in migration rates, in other words alterations in migration behaviour through time.  Table 2 
provides some insights into these changes.  The vast majority of groups register decreases, the only 
exceptions being private renters and communal dwellers who were more spatially mobile in 2001-11 
than in 1971-81 but whose share of the population was lower in 2001 than in 1971.  Mention might 
also be made of those aged 25-34; this group’s address-changing rate was only marginally lower than 
in 1971-81 although there are big decreases for older age groups.  The picture, however, is one of 
general decline – address-changing rates have fallen for the vast majority of demographic groups.  
 
Table 3 provides aggregated statistics – once again, full details of the raw output are tabulated in the 
Appendix.  In Table 3, these coefficients are multiplied by 100 to transform them back into terms of 
the original migration rates per 100 people.  Columns 2, 4, and 6 (headed coefficients) show the 
contribution of each variable to the raw percentage point differentials in migration rates in 1971-81 
and 2001-11 and the other columns headed ‘%’ present this as a percentage contribution.  Looking 
first at all address changes and what can be attributed to population composition it is seen that in total 
this contributes 3.92 percentage points to the 10.8 percentage point differential.  This is just over a 
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third of the differential, the remainder being unexplained by population composition changes but 
instead by decreases in migration behaviour, including the constant intercept term (at just over 70%), 
but a roughly 10% increase from the residual. The main compositional factors that are driving the all-
address changing rate down are population ageing (especially those aged 35-44 and those over 65) 
and the shift to owner occupation from other tenures, particularly private renting.   Evidence in support 
of these more detailed comments can be found in Table A2 of the appendix.  These downward 
compositional pushes outweigh those countervailing compositional changes from increases in the 
share of the population with degrees, changes in marital status with more single and divorced people 
(both mobile groups), and SEG with a growth in higher-level more mobile groups.   
 
However, it cannot be emphasised enough that the majority of the decline in all-address changing 
rates is attributable to the changed migration behaviour of population sub-groups and the downward 
pressure of the constant term.  The coefficients in Table 3 will vary according to the base categories 
selected so care is needed in interpreting these results.  However, after the Oaxaca-Blinder procedure 
has made controls akin to a multiple regression it is found that there are falls associated with age and 
marital status but rate increases for other groups.  However, there is a major downward effect 
associated with the constant term.  This can be viewed as a general rate effect that cuts across groups 
forcing all rates downwards, which is similar to that observed by Cooke (2011) and which he attributes 
to secular rootedness.  The constant does a substantial amount of work in explaining the overall all 
address-changing decrease so some thoughts about this will be advanced later in the discussion 
 
The situation for moves of less than 10km is similar to that for all address changing, and moves of 50 
or more kilometres in some regards, but differs in other important respects. Address changes in this 
distance band are compared against people who do not change address or those who move 10km or 
more. The results are similar in that that the majority of the 9.38 percentage point differential between 
1971-81 and 2001-11 is accounted for by rate changes rather than changes in population composition.  
It is also similar in that the ageing of the population seems to be the most important compositional 
driver of the rate fall and that changing housing tenure seems also to have a major role.  The ageing of 
the population and the shift away from private and social renting to owner occupation seem to have 
contributed to a fall in address changes in this distance band.  Education, however, has an opposite 
effect to the other two models but this is not unexpected since increasing proportions of graduates 
will, everything else being equal, increase the proportion of longer-distance movers at the expense of 
short-distance movers.  The coefficient section of the model differs in that mostly it contributes to the 
migration decrease and the constant has a positive rather than a negative effect.  This latter 
observation suggests that a universal effect is pushing up the share of moves of 10km or less relative 
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to the reference categories.  Interesting are the strong negative effects of age and region – and 
inspection of the detailed tables in the appendix suggests that these observations can be explained by 
rate decreases in the North relative to the South East and the declining migration rates of older groups 
of the population relative to the reference category of those aged 16 to 24.  The net effect of the 
residual term is very small. 
 
The interpretation of the model for moves of 50km or greater is more problematic.  There is a decrease 
in the migration rate between 1971-81 and 2001-11 but it is a small percentage point decrease on an 
initially low rate.  The difference between the two rates is statistically significant although its 
substantive meaning must be questioned especially since the evidence produced by Champion and 
Shuttleworth (2016a) suggested that longer-distance migration in England and Wales had not 
experienced the same secular decline since the 1970s as observed in the USA by Cooke and others.  
However, if viewed as a percentage decline, a fall of nearly 16% between the two time periods is worth 
further commentary and some interesting contrasts between all address changes and these longer 
distance moves can be observed. The net effects of changes in population composition are small with 
the positive effects of increased education and shifts in SEG being outweighed by the effects of ageing 
and tenure.  It is interesting to observe, however, that the greater share in the population with degrees 
has a slightly larger effect here since longer-distance moves are often associated with higher levels of 
education and it might be expected therefore that this compositional effect would have a greater 
influence at this distance band.  The net effect of changes in behaviour (the coefficients part of the 
model) is also negative but most of this can be attributed to the constant term which more than fully 
counteracts the modelled rate increases for some sub-groups such as those without degrees (relative 
to those with) and the modelled increases across age.  As before, the coefficients part of the model is 
more important than the endowments section which deals with population composition, and the 
importance of the constant suggests a universal effect that cuts across all population groups.   
   
Discussion 
The results presented are exploratory rather than definitive and should be interpreted with 
appropriate caution.  Nevertheless, it is possible to be confident about the general factors that underlie 
the decline in all-address changing and moves of less than 10km in particular between 1971-81 and 
2001-11.  Firstly, changes in population composition have played some role in the decrease as in the 
United States (Cooke 2011) but, just as in the USA, they do not explain fully what has happened 
contributing at most between 35%-40% to the fall.  This is likely to be an upper estimate since the 
exclusion of students, especially from the 2001-11 decade, exaggerates the impacts of population age 
shifts; the contribution of changes in age composition, and therefore of changing population structure 
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in general, may thus be somewhat less than measured here.  Despite this, the combined effects of age 
and housing tenure changes outweigh the upward pushing effects of increasing education, the growth 
of professional and technical occupations, and the decline in the proportion of married people.  This is 
an important finding but it leaves more questions open than it answers since the majority of the decline 
in migration is explained by changes in the way that people are behaving, in other words rate or 
behavioural effects.  These suggest that demographic sub-groups in 2001-11 simply behave differently 
than they did in 1971-81 in that they were less migratory in the latter decade.  We do not know why 
this is the case, but it is possible to advance some informed hypotheses to guide future research from 
the analysis that has been done to date. 
 
The cardinal points to note are that all demographic sub-groups appear to have experienced a fall in 
migration rates and that most of this decline has been at the spatial scale of moves of 10km or less 
best represented by the all-addressing changing model.  The importance of the constant term indicates 
that there is a general effect pushing down migration rates.  This observation is sufficient in 
combination with the evidence that changes in population composition contribute to, but do not fully 
explain the decline, to suggest further avenues for analysis and enquiry. It seems there is something 
different about 2001-11 than 1971-81.  This might be termed a ‘period effect’, perhaps secular 
rootedness (Cooke 2011), that has acted to depress migration rates and change internal migratory 
behaviour generally.  One part of this period effect might be the economic/business cycle.  This acts 
across entire populations but on average it is probable that various cycles have balanced out across 
the two decades that have been the subject of the analysis; anyway, the migration decline appears to 
have started in the 1990s (Champion and Shuttleworth 2016b) and therefore predates the Great 
Recession of 2008 which seems the only plausible short-term period effect that would be a candidate 
to explain the much lower migration rates for all-address changes and less than 10km in 2001-11.  This 
suggests that there are longer-term period effects in operation which mean that the England and 
Wales of 2001-11 differed greatly from that of the 1970s, and which are particularly important for 
short-distance moves.  These period factors are ignored by the models that underlie this analysis which 
concentrate on only the individual correlates of migration, and missing these factors would explain the 
large proportion of the differentials accounted for by rate effects, particularly the constant terms.   
 
There are many possible migration drivers (see Green 2018) and which might cause deep-rooted 
structural changes of the sort that differentiate 2001-11 from the period thirty years before.  These 
include changes in the regional geography of economic production, advances in transport which mean 
commuting over a variety of spatial scales is now easier than in the past, the growth of two-earner 
households, the expansion of higher education, and the increased use of electronic and internet-based 
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communication technologies.  These either singly or in combination have been advanced in to explain 
the migration decline since the 1970s in the USA (Molloy et al 2011; Partridge et al 2013).   However, 
there are important differences between cases of the USA and England and Wales; rather than being 
a decline across all spatial scales as in the USA (Cooke 2018), the fall in England and Wales is 
concentrated at shorter distances.  Moreover, it appears to be more marked for older people.  All this 
directs attention to those factors that are primarily associated with short-distance migration, and chief 
amongst these is the housing market.  This suggests that efforts to understand migration declines in 
England and Wales might usefully be directed at exploring changes in the housing market and their 
effects on the rootedness of older people over and above the shifting shares of owner occupation, 
social renting and private renting.   
 
The UK housing market is exceptional by international standards, constrained by problems of 
affordability and supply and has experienced the highest house price increases relative to wages of 
any OECD country (Hilber and Vermeulen 2016).  This has been exacerbated by various aspects of 
government policy – the reliance on the housing market as a tool of economic policy combined with 
planning constraints, and the downplaying of the role of the social-rented sector and local authorities 
as housing providers.  There has been a decline in the total number of dwellings completed in England 
from 378,320 in 1969-70 to 168,350 in 2015-161 whilst the number of annual dwellings required to 
meet need is estimated to be around 300,000 per year (Heath 2014).  House-price inflation may mean 
that owner occupiers become trapped and it might mean there are benefits from investing in an 
existing property and staying put than moving around and changing address for those already on the 
housing ladder (Hilber and Vermeulen 2016).  This combination, not just the increase in owner 
occupation – its compositional effect – but also the type of owner occupation in terms of the wider 
price and economic context (its effect on behaviour or its rate effect) – would seem to offer strong 
inducements not to move especially for older people.  For younger people it has been noted that their 
main achievement is now to get a foot on the housing ladder and to leave the parental home.  This 
might divert them, where available, into other tenure types like private and social renting but equally, 
where demand outstrips supply, to some young adults remaining in the parental home, a phenomenon 
that has been linked to migration slowdowns in other countries such as Italy, Japan and Australia (Heins 
et al 2018; Fielding 2018; Bell et al 2018). 
 
                                                          
1 Table 209, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-house-building, accessed 
April 25th 2017 
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If this account has any truth, there ought to be ‘frustrated movers’ who would want to change address 
but are otherwise now unable to do so.   Unfortunately, there is very little secondary evidence on 
migration intentions before the event – most examines the attitudes and experiences of movers after 
the event – and there is even less longitudinal or cross-sectional data with sufficient temporal depth 
to examine how migration intentions, barriers and events have changed since the 1970s (Champion 
and Shuttleworth 2016b) so to develop these ideas further will require the collection of new data.  
Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the housing market on its own is the sole explanation; it 
might, for example, be that the residential relocation-commuting nexus is also worthy of more 
consideration since longer commutes might reduce the needs for address changing within the same 
labour market (although this would not avoid the needs for longer-distance moves).  There is evidence 
that these have only declined marginally (by 1.3 percentage points) or using other metrics and data 
not at all (Champion and Shuttleworth 2016a) in England and Wales.   
 
Conclusions 
The Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions in the paper are useful and make a contribution. It was possible 
to include many of the individual correlates/determinants of migration in the analysis and the results 
provide useful information on the likely importance of compositional population changes as well as 
pointing out where it might be possible to search for more answers.  The chief finding is that changing 
population make-up accounts for around 35% to 40% of the migration decline in England and Wales 
with the rest attributable to changed behaviour and, especially for the all-address changing model, 
large constant terms which suggest forces that cut across all population groups.  As noted earlier, this 
35%-40% might be an over estimate but this simply leaves more importance for changed behaviour 
and the constant term.  The large constant terms suggest large period effects that are driving migration 
rate changes – perhaps a British version of secular rootedness. It may well be that this British version 
of secular rootedness is something to do with the housing market.   This is implied by the fact that 
most of the change in England and Wales is over small spatial scales of 10km where housing is 
important in motivating address changing and there is enough evidence of the peculiarities of the UK 
housing market not to rule this idea out of court completely. 
 
What are the trends for the future? Many of the compositional changes noted between 1971 and 2001 
will still trend in the same direction in the future; the population will age, become more educated, and 
more white collar barring any unexpected major shocks.  The compositional factors of the population 
will therefore still probably push migration rates downwards as in the past.  However, there is room 
for uncertainty associated with the resurgence of the private-rental sector.  By 2011, there were more 
private renters than in 2001, and this should have acted to push migration upwards through the decade 
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as more sample members found themselves in this traditionally-mobile tenure.  If this trend continues, 
then the next census in 2021 may yield different results.  Despite this, however, there is no getting 
away from the fact that it is changed behaviour, people simply being less migratory, that is the main 
cause of migration decline in England and Wales and that without changed behaviour – and perhaps 
changed housing policies? – the population will not get more mobile.   
 
Whether the decline is important is for debate, but if thought has not yet been given to this by 
policymakers it is recommended that it now is.  Stable populations can equal stable communities – an 
ideal for some – but there can be substantial downsides.  These include people struggling to be socially 
mobile since social mobility is often associated with residential relocation, the danger that people can 
live compartmentalised lives in spatial silos, and that adjustment to labour market changes can be 
hindered by spatial immobility.  Some of these concerns might be unwarranted; perhaps commuting 
and electronic communications can compensate for residential immobility; perhaps the link between 
social and spatial mobility is being weakened; residential moves might now be less relevant because 
of other forms of daily, weekly and monthly mobility.  However, little is yet known about these issues 
through the particular lens of ‘migration slowdown’ and so further data collection and analysis are 
needed.   
 
The research challenge for the future is to understand more about why migratory behaviour is different 
now to what is was in the past, and especially, to get to grips more with the constant term.  This can 
be attributed to ‘secular rootedness’ (Cooke 2011) but it is necessary to probe behind this label to 
understand why more people today are immobile than in the past.  Factors leading to more residential 
rootedness include increased social capital where community is valued more highly (Green 2018) and 
the use of ICT (Cooke and Shuttleworth 2017) so further research is needed to consider how, were and 
why these factors operate.  It is also possible that the US version of secular rootedness differs from the 
British in that it is likely that the UK housing market also leads to immobility and might be just the long-
term period effect that is being sought.  Ideally, therefore, it would have been useful to have included 
other social, labour market, technological and housing variables in the current models that would have 
encapsulated how the environment of the first decade of 21st Century in England and Wales differed 
from that of the 1970s but in practice that would have been problematic given the data and methods 
used.  To take the research agenda further will thus require new approaches, data collection, and 
analyses.    
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Tables 
Table 1: Explanatory Variable Descriptions and Counts 
Explanatory variable 1971-81 2001-11 
Gender 
  
Male (reference) 129697 141593 
Female 144445 156307 
Age group 
  
16-24 (reference) 47612 26102 
25-34 55039 60034 
35-44 53572 69693 
45-54 53109 63227 
55-64 43168 47957 
65-74 21642 30887 
Country of birth 
  
UK born (reference) 256139 267743 
Not UK Born 18003 30157 
Education 
  
Degree (reference) 19812 60374 
No degree 254330 237526 
Marital status 
  
Single (reference) 51518 75644 
Married 205616 185028 
Widowed 13398 10697 
Divorced 3610 26531 
Housing tenure 
  
Owner occupied (reference) 141440 231380 
Social renting 81736 41038 
Private renting 47795 23881 
Communal 3171 1601 
Economic activity 
  
Employed full-time (reference) 147222 133891 
Employed part-time 26076 41206 
Self employed 14531 27610 
Unemployed 6317 9141 
Sick 3882 15232 
Retired 17048 39393 
Inactive 59066 31427 
SEG 
  
Professional (reference) 7175 13920 
Intermediate 34702 86947 
Skilled non-manual  44353 69941 
Skilled manual 56974 54195 
Part skilled 41044 45681 
Unskilled 14713 14013 
Armed forces 1295 857 
Other 73886 12346 
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Region 
  
South East (reference) 103273 114788 
South West 22798 28835 
Midlands 50482 56184 
North 82396 81764 
Wales 15193 16329 
Outcome variables 
All address changes 142009 122173 
Moves =>50km 23407 21493 
Moves <10km 96093 71934 
Total 274142 297900 
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Table 2: Summary Descriptive Statistics 
Characteristic at start 
of decade 
Composition at start of 
decade 
All address change rate for 
decade 
%point change 
71-81 to 01-11 
1971-
1981 
2001-
2011 
%point 
change 
1971-
1981 
2001-
2011 
%point 
change 
Under 
10km  
50km 
or more 
Gender         
Male  47.3 47.5 +0.2 53.2 42.0 -11.2 -10.3 -1.0 
Female 52.7 52.5 -0.2 50.6 40.1 -10.5 -8.6 -0.6 
Age         
16-24  17.4 8.8 -8.6 85.6 79.2 -6.4 -5.0 -0.8 
25-34 20.1 20.2 +0.1 63.9 63.3 -0.6 -1.7 -0.7 
35-44 19.5 23.4 +3.9 43.3 40.0 -3.3 -3.8 -0.4 
45-54 19.4 21.2 +1.9 36.1 28.1 -8.0 -9.1 +0.0 
55-64 15.8 16.1 +0.4 37.6 24.0 -13.6 -11.9 -1.6 
65-74 7.9 10.4 +2.5 36.7 20.5 -16.2 -14.2 -1.5 
Country of birth         
UK  93.4 89.9 -3.6 51.4 41.3 -10.0 -8.9 -1.2 
Not UK 6.6 10.1 +3.6 58.2 38.3 -19.9 -16.1 -2.3 
Marital status         
Single  18.8 25.4 +6.6 72.4 62.6 -9.8 -8.6 -0.6 
Married 75.0 62.1 -12.9 47.1 32.7 -14.4 -11.5 -2.0 
Widowed 4.9 3.6 -1.3 41.9 25.5 -16.4 -15.4 -1.0 
Divorced 1.3 8.9 +7.6 63.0 43.6 -19.4 -15.8 -2.5 
Housing tenure         
Owner occupied  51.6 77.7 +26.1 46.8 37.4 -9.4 -6.1 -2.8 
Social renting 29.8 13.8 -16.0 49.4 40.1 -9.3 -9.6 +0.3 
Private renting 17.4 8.0 -9.4 69.0 74.9 +5.9 -2.6 +4.2 
Communal 1.2 0.5 -0.6 76.7 80.6 +4.0 -3.8 +6.2 
Economic activity         
Employed full-time  53.7 44.9 -8.8 56.4 48.7 -7.8 -8.5 -0.4 
Employed part-time 9.5 13.8 +4.3 42.1 35.8 -6.3 -5.1 -1.5 
Self employed 5.3 9.3 +4.0 52.6 40.0 -12.6 -11.0 -0.6 
Unemployed 2.3 3.1 +0.8 62.6 51.2 -11.4 -9.4 -1.8 
Sick 1.4 5.1 +3.7 48.1 34.9 -13.2 -11.8 +0.2 
Retired 6.2 13.2 +7.0 36.7 20.7 -16.0 -13.8 -1.5 
Inactive 21.6 10.6 -11.0 47.8 41.5 -6.3 -4.3 -1.6 
Education         
Degree  7.2 20.3 +13.0 58.1 47.0 -11.0 -4.1 -6.4 
No degree 92.8 79.7 -13.0 51.3 39.5 -11.8 -9.5 -1.8 
SEG         
Professional  2.6 4.7 +2.1 58.4 43.9 -14.6 -7.2 -4.5 
Intermediate 12.7 29.2 +16.5 55.4 44.1 -11.3 -5.9 -4.4 
Skilled non-manual  16.2 23.5 +7.3 58.8 41.9 -16.9 -9.6 -3.9 
Skilled manual 20.8 18.2 -2.6 50.7 38.7 -12.0 -11.9 +0.0 
Part skilled 15.0 15.3 +0.4 49.6 38.2 -11.4 -10.6 -0.5 
Unskilled 5.4 4.7 -0.7 48.7 34.6 -14.1 -15.1 +0.2 
Armed forces 0.5 0.3 -0.2 90.6 73.8 -16.8 -0.1 -18.0 
Other 27.0 4.1 -22.8 47.3 37.0 -10.3 -5.4 -3.5 
Region         
South East  37.7 38.5 +0.9 54.1 44.6 -9.6 -7.2 -2.0 
South West 8.3 9.7 +1.4 51.0 42.3 -8.7 -7.9 -1.6 
Midlands 18.4 18.9 +0.4 49.9 39.1 -10.8 -10.1 -0.7 
North 30.1 27.5 -2.6 51.2 38.1 -13.2 -11.5 -1.3 
Wales 5.5 5.5 -0.1 46.8 35.2 -11.6 -11.4 -0.7 
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Total 100.0 100.0 0.0 51.8 41.0 -10.8 -9.4 -1.3 
 
Source: calculated from ONS Longitudinal Study. Crown copyright data. 
Note: Population comprises all LS members aged 15-74 at the start of the decade with a record in the following 
census. excluding students at start of the decade: N for 1971-1981 274.142; N for 2001-2011 297.900. Shaded 
cells denote types with an above-average rate of all address changing in 1971-81.  
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Table 3: Summary Oaxaca-Blinder Results expressed as percentage points and percentage of raw difference 
Variable All moves Moves =>50km Moves <=10km 
1971-81 rate 51.80 
 
8.50 
 
35.10 
 
2001-11 rate 41.00 
 
7.20 
 
25.70 
 
Difference -10.80 
 
-1.30 
 
-9.38 
 
       
Endowments Coefficients % Coefficients % Coefficients % 
Region 0.10 0.94 0.09 6.76 -0.05 -0.51 
Gender 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Age -3.61 -33.50 -0.48 -36.39 -2.43 -25.93 
COB -0.09 -0.81 -0.07 -4.94 0.03 0.31 
Education 0.32 2.95 0.51 38.16 -0.37 -3.93 
Marital status 0.99 9.16 0.08 6.09 0.60 6.42 
Tenure -2.64 -24.44 -0.77 -58.55 -1.47 -15.70 
Econ activity -0.12 -1.10 -0.15 -11.42 0.06 0.69 
SEG 1.13 10.45 0.84 63.66 -0.35 -3.69 
Total -3.92 -36.34 0.04 3.40 -3.97 -42.34 
       
Rate coefficients 
      
Region -0.97 -8.99 0.45 -33.91 -1.74 -18.52 
Gender -0.39 -3.58 -0.20 -14.85 -0.07 -0.76 
Age 0.93 8.62 1.17 88.67 -2.01 -21.46 
COB -0.83 -7.66 -0.06 -4.57 -0.70 -7.45 
Education 1.21 11.21 2.17 164.31 -0.27 -2.87 
Marital status -1.26 -11.67 -0.88 -66.14 -0.28 -3.00 
Tenure 0.41 3.84 0.86 64.94 -0.78 -8.32 
Econ activity -0.42 -3.87 -0.01 -0.41 0.08 0.84 
SEG 1.28 11.89 -0.07 -4.93 -0.56 -5.94 
Constant -7.88 -73.04 -5.99 -452.82 1.22 12.97 
Total -7.90 -73.25 -2.54 -191.89 -5.11 -54.50 
       
Residual 
      
Region -0.09 -0.81 0.00 0.16 -0.08 -0.81 
Gender 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 
Age -0.06 -0.52 -0.13 -9.75 0.25 2.67 
COB 0.29 2.69 0.02 1.60 0.25 2.62 
Education 0.20 1.83 0.36 26.87 -0.04 -0.47 
Marital status 0.30 2.76 -0.04 -2.82 0.33 3.54 
Tenure 0.49 4.53 1.00 75.93 -0.91 -9.70 
Econ activity -0.04 -0.41 -0.20 -15.20 0.13 1.43 
SEG -0.05 -0.47 0.16 11.75 -0.23 -2.43 
Total 1.03 9.59 1.17 88.49 -0.30 -3.16 
 
